Nuclear Fuel Facilities and Their Hazards
Potential theaters of operation contain fully functional nuclear fuel cycle facilities. These include:
- Mining
- Milling
- Enriching
- Fabricating
- Reprocessing facilities
Each has its own radiological hazards. PM experts must have basic fuel cycle (Figure 1) knowledge, including mining techniques (e.g., open pit, in-situ leaching), enrichment techniques (e.g., gaseous diffusion, centrifugal), and reactor types (e.g., pressurized, boiling water).
Figure 1
Common fuel production hazards include uranium oxides (yellow cake (Figure 2), uranium hexafluoride, and “tailings" (ore extraction residue containing thorium, radium, and other radionuclides). Metal fragments from fabrication processes and reactor facilities may be scavenged from scrap yards. Radiological systems at abandoned reactor facilities may release radioactive effluents or fission product gases. These effluents can contaminate the food chain or water table.
Personnel may also encounter spent fuel storage facilities or low-level radioactive waste storage areas (Figure 3). Other hazards at nuclear fuel cycle facilities may include contaminated work areas, personal protective equipment, and tools as well as activated metals.
Figure 2
Figure 3
Biomedical
Hospitals use RAM for therapeutics and diagnostics. Soldiers may encounter radiation-generating devices such as x-ray machines and linear accelerators, which emit high-energy neutrons or protons for cancer treatments when activated.
The Gamma Knife® (Figure 4) contains multiple cobalt-60 sources to selectively irradiate and destroy tumor tissue. Brachytherapy sources are minute pellets placed in the body for cancer treatment. These sources are easy to lose or conceal. Such sources are potential radiological exposure devices.
Soldiers should be trained to identify and avoid these and other hazards, such as unsealed radioiodine and technetium generators (Figure 5) if they are known to be in the OE.
Figure 4
Figure 5
Army Commodities and Foreign Materiel Sources
United States (U.S.) stock materiel includes high activity tritium items such as fire control devices for howitzers, mortars, and Abrams tanks. Lower tritium activity may be found in older lensatic compasses, current personal weapon sight posts (Figure 6), and aviation dials. PM staff should know the actions to take for broken tritium devices.
Some compasses, sights, and dial devices may instead contain radium, depending on the manufacturing date. The M72 Light
Antitank Weapon (LAW) may contain radioactive promethium. Such devices should be clearly marked with CAUTION placards (Figure 7).
Figure 6
Figure 7
Figure 8
Engineer units use moisture density gauges for construction (Figure 8). These devices may contain radioactive cesium, americium, beryllium, californium, or another gamma or neutron emitter.
Depleted uranium (DU) is cheap to manufacture, readily available, and has high mass density. It is ideal for aviation weight and balance components, armor (such as in the Abrams turret plating), and armor piercing rounds (such as the M829 armor-piercing sabot). Although mainly a toxic heavy metal concern, DU does present a low-level radioactivity hazard.
Chemical agent detectors, such as the ICAM or ACADA, contain sealed nickel-63 or other radiological sources. Soldiers should leave these sources intact and only perform user-level maintenance as authorized in the appropriate technical manuals (TMs). Supply personnel should be aware of transportation requirements, normally addressed in the TM.
Foreign commodities may not be labeled or may contain unfamiliar language. Foreign sources do not normally present hazards to personnel working close to them but may be hazardous if damaged or tampered with. Use Technical Bulletin (TB) 43-0116,
Identification of Radioactive Items in the Army and National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) 1162-325-98,
Identification Guide for Radioactive Sources in Foreign Materiel (For Official Use Only) to identify radiological commodities. Treat foreign commodities as the equivalent U.S. radiological commodity. Assume foreign military commodities are similarly radioactive as the comparable U.S. commodity (e.g., self-luminous dials and sights, chemical agent detectors).
Industrial Sources
Agricultural, scientific, manufacturing, and educational industries use RAM. Radiographic cameras detect cracks in pipes and structures. High activity sources sterilize medical equipment and food. Universities use RAM to conduct research. PM experts should analyze the OE and brief Service members and commanders on hazards and mitigations.
Conclusion
PM staff advise commanders and protect the Force from radiological hazards. However, the Unit's PM Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers know the mission and Soldiers best. They incorporate this technical support into the overall risk assessment using information in TG 238.
References
- International Atomic Energy Agency. 2014. The Radiological Accident in Lia, Georgia. Vienna: IAEA. ISBN 978-92-0- 103614-8. Retrieved 6 April 2021.
https://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1660web-81061875.pdf
- International Atomic Energy Agency. 1988. The Radiological Accident in Goiania. Vienna: IAEA. ISBN 92-0-129088-8. Retrieved 6 April 2021.
https://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub815_web.pdf
- International Atomic Energy Agency. 2002. The Radiological Accident in Samut Prakarn. Vienna: IAEA. ISBN 92-0- 110902-4. Retrieved 6 April 2021.
https://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1124_scr.pdf
- APHC. 2024.
Depleted Uranium – Individual, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. https://ph.health.mil/topics/workplacehealth/hp/Pages/du-service-member-info.aspx
